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Abstract
This paper investigates time variations in the implementation of legislative requests by the 
Swiss government. Combining the literature on executive–legislative relations with find-
ings from implementation research, we focus on the procedural level and argue that imple-
mentation delays can occur because the government does not want to, cannot or should not 
implement faster. We test these mechanisms using a unique database, which enables us to 
analyse a systematic collection of all legislative requests that have been approved between 
the parliament’s 2003 winter session and its 2018 spring session. Our results show that the 
considerable variation in the time needed for the legislative mandates’ implementation is 
mostly related to the Swiss government’s inability to transpose faster, i.e. to factors like 
highly busy administrative offices or complex and controversial issues. In contrast, there 
is no support for the ideas that the government “shall not” or “does not want to” transpose 
faster.
Keywords Parliamentary requests · Motions · Implementation delay · Executive–legislative 
relation · Rule-making · Implementation · Switzerland
Introduction
Legislation is one of parliaments’ core functions. The legislature’s active influence on the 
legislative process primarily depends on the degree of institutional independence between 
government and parliament (Colomer & Negretto, 2005; Shugart & Carey, 1992). In con-
trast to parliamentary systems with a strong entanglement of powers, systems with a strong 
separation of powers have legislatures with an active and independent position. How the 
government deals with parliamentary requests, especially in these systems, and what fac-
tors influence the government’s responsiveness are questions of particular democratic-
theoretical and practical interest, since parliamentary instruments are used as a means of 
both legislating and monitoring the executive. Thus, parliamentary requests are central 
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instruments that parliaments use to fulfil their legislative and control functions (Mattson, 
1995). However, arguably, governments increasingly dominate this relationship and only 
implement parliamentary requests if they want to (Graf, 2014: 829). In parliamentary sys-
tems specifically, there is a broad scholarly consensus that the government controls the 
agenda, while the parliament’s role is limited to accepting or rejecting proposals (Tsebelis, 
2009). Nevertheless, the reality seems to be more complex even in presidential systems 
where, according to Tsebelis (1995: 325), “the legislature makes the proposals and the 
executive (the president) signs or vetoes them”. Thus, the parliaments’ legislative agenda-
setting power has usually and very generally been considered to be rather weak, which, in 
turn, nourishes and consolidates the “decline of parliament” thesis.
This paper, which aims at contributing to the literature on parliaments’ legislative 
agenda-setting and control powers and the associated executive–legislative relations, takes 
this as its starting point. However, unlike previous research that mostly focuses on institu-
tional factors to distinguish between strong and weak governments and parliaments (see, 
for example, Bernauer & Vatter, 2019; Döring 2001; Fish, 2006; Mattson, 1995; Rasch & 
Tsebelis, 2011; Siaroff, 2003), this paper emphasizes the relevance of the procedural level. 
We argue that in order to assess the relative power of the executive and the legislative bod-
ies, we should go beyond formal rules and settings and consider specifically whether and to 
what degree the executive is able to control the legislation process in practice. One central 
moment is when the government reacts to parliamentary requests and implements them. 
Thus, our paper investigates different mechanisms explaining lengthy or speedy implemen-
tation processes. More precisely, we seek to explain time variation in implementing parlia-
mentary requests.
We combine the literature on executive–legislative relations with findings from research 
on implementation and, specifically, on bureaucratic rule-making in the USA, to deduce 
different hypotheses about why governments do not implement parliamentary requests 
in due time. These mechanisms are related to procedural, rather than to institutional fac-
tors, namely: opposition from within the government (i.e. the government does not want to 
implement), inability to implement (i.e. the government cannot do so), or opposition from 
within the parliament (i.e. the government should not implement). In view of these three 
mechanisms, we also argue that neglecting to implement may not necessarily be an indica-
tor of a strong government (i.e. an executive that only implements parliamentary demands 
if it wants to). Rather, different reasons may lead to this outcome. Hence, insights into the 
factors that explain the time variation in implementing parliamentary requests improve our 
understanding of the relationship between the executive and the legislative.
Empirically, we focus on the Swiss case and provide new insights into the factors that 
determine how and, particularly, how fast the government reacts to parliamentary (proce-
dural) requests. Our central variable of interest is implementation time defined as the time 
between the moment the parliament approves a parliamentary request (and thus mandates 
the Federal Council to deal with that request) and the moment the parliament abandons it 
(i.e. considers the request fulfilled). We rely on official data (CUBE data set, Parliamentary 
Control of the Administration, 2018) that enables us to analyse the full sample of 2233 
motions and postulates approved between the parliament’s 2003 winter session and its 2018 
spring session. The focus on many requests within a single country is well in keeping with 
our interest in procedural factors and allows us to keep the institutional setting constant.
The contribution of our study is twofold:
On the one hand, it provides new insights into the Swiss case, which is particularly 
interesting for analysing the relative power of the parliament and the government in the 
legislative policy-making process. Switzerland stands out for its unusual system of 
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executive–legislative relations, which combines elements from both parliamentary and 
presidential systems (Schwarz et  al., 2011; Vatter & Wirz, 2015). Just like in presiden-
tial systems, the Swiss parliament, i.e. the Federal Assembly, enjoys a relatively independ-
ent position vis-à-vis the government (Graf et  al., 2014), i.e. the Federal Council. This 
is because members of the government are not allowed to hold seats in the parliament 
(Lüthi, 2007) and the government cannot be dissolved through a vote of no confidence 
(Vatter, 2020). Moreover, the Swiss political system grants parliamentarians the right to 
initiate legislation without imposing numerical, temporal, technical, or content-related 
restrictions (Flick Witzig & Bernauer, 2018; Mattson, 1995; Siaroff, 2003; Vatter, 2020). 
Thus, compared to their counterparts in other countries, Swiss parliamentarians are hardly 
constrained in their right to initiate a legislative process. However, if a Swiss member of 
parliament (MP) exercises his/her right to initiate legislation in Switzerland, this does not 
automatically curtail the executive’s potential to influence the legislative outcome. Rather, 
legislative rules concerning parliamentary requests open different windows of opportu-
nity for governments to influence the following legislative process. Indeed, the Swiss gov-
ernment has repeatedly been accused of exerting its influence by delaying parliamentary 
requests (see, for example, Graf, 1991; Political Institutions Committee (PIC-N), 2007). 
Nevertheless, even though the Swiss government plays a pivotal role in shaping execu-
tive–legislative relations and, consequently, in shaping and maintaining democracy, to 
date, we still know little about whether and why the Swiss government really delays the 
implementation of parliamentary requests. This paper aims at filling this gap theoretically 
and empirically.
On the other hand, the present study and its results are also relevant beyond the Swiss 
case. First, it departs from the fact that in parliamentary systems, legislatures tend to be 
considered particularly weak. While in theory, “the legislature notionally controls the exec-
utive, the relationship often in practice works the other way around” (Russel and Cowley, 
2016: 121). Accordingly, in many parliamentary systems the government effectively initi-
ates legislation, while the legislature merely agrees to the executive’s legislative initiatives. 
Thus, different studies emphasize the “parliamentary decline thesis” and, in particular, the 
powerlessness of the legislature in the Westminster systems (King & Crewe, 2013; Krep-
pel, 2014). Knill and Tosun (2012: 139) sum up existing research: “Despite the name ‘par-
liamentary democracy’, the parliament plays only a limited role in decision-making in the 
British Westminster model”. Our article aims to provide an answer to the relevant question 
of what could happen if the legislature actually exercised its right to initiate legislation in 
practice. Using Switzerland as a test case enables us to examine the relationship between 
the executive and the legislative branches in a context of multipartism, coalition govern-
ment, and heterogeneous cultures, which is typical of most European countries. Such anal-
yses make it possible to draw conclusions about European countries looking for alterna-
tives to the prevailing parliamentary system with weak legislatures, which has come under 
increasing criticism (see Sciarini et al., 2021).
Second, we focus on the mechanisms explaining governments’ “behaviour” when they 
implement parliamentary requests. We expect that these mechanisms may also be relevant 
to other situations in which governments and their administrations implement legislative 
decisions. Some examples are bureaucratic rule-making (Bolton et al., 2016; Potter, 2017) 
and also subnational or supranational multilevel governance, e.g. the implementation of 
EU directives (Borghetto & Franchino, 2010; König & Luetgert, 2009). While both the 
political systems and the stages of policy making of these examples vary, all of them are 
characterized by an implementing body that has more or less leeway and, relatedly, power 
in the implementation process. The Swiss case may be particularly informative to the 
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investigation of the mechanisms that shape these relationships because it is an intermediary 
case on the parliamentary strength continuum, incorporating both parliamentary and presi-
dential features (Sciarini et al., 2021).1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section seeks to contex-
tualize our case by taking a closer look at the main instruments that the Swiss parliament 
can use to initiate a legislative process. In “Reasons for Delaying Parliamentary Legislative 
Requests: Theoretical Approach and Hypotheses” section, we discuss the main theoretical 
assumptions about how and why the government may delay parliamentary requests. Given 
the scarcity of scientific attention to these questions, we develop our theoretical framework 
by combining discourses and evidence from parliamentary research with key findings from 
implementation research and then advance our main hypotheses. The “Methodology” sec-
tion focuses on our methodological approach and the operationalization of our variables. 
We present and discuss the findings of our statistical analysis in  the “Empirical Results” 
section. The paper concludes with a brief summary of our main findings and a discussion 
of their implications.
The legislative agenda‑setting power of the Swiss parliament: 
instruments and processes
From an international perspective, the Swiss political system stands out for its institutional-
ization of direct democratic instruments, its decentralized federalism, and its unique system 
of proportional power-sharing within and between the executive and the legislative body 
(Linder, 2007; Linder & Mueller, 2021). According to these institutional features of power-
sharing, many different political actors, including the government and the parliament but 
also the people and the cantons, can provide the impetus for legislative regulations in Swit-
zerland. While all these actors have been using their right to initiate legislation, to date, the 
large majority of bills is initiated and drafted by the government, i.e. the Federal Council 
(Vatter, 2018). Indeed, as Lüthi (2007, 140) puts it, the Swiss parliament’s involvement in 
the political decision-making process often occurs at a relatively late stage. Accordingly, 
the parliament’s legislative agenda-setting power has usually been considered to be rather 
weak (see, for example, Brüschweiler & Vatter, 2018; Lüthi, 2007; Schwarz et al., 2011; 
Vatter, 2020). However, more recent studies indicate that MPs have increasingly been 
making use of instruments that allow them to set the legislative agenda themselves (see, 
for example, Brüschweiler & Vatter, 2018; Jaquet et  al., 2019), i.e. to use their positive 
agenda-setting power (Jenkins et al., 2016).
1 The Swiss parliament is an intermediary case because, on the one hand, it has a very independent and 
strong institutional position vis-à-vis the government (election of the government and the judiciary by the 
legislature, extended rights of initiative and participation, no control by a constitutional court) and on the 
other, the Swiss militia parliament has very few human, financial, and material resources, which signifi-
cantly weakens its control and legislative power vis-à-vis the government (Vatter 2018: 58). “Focusing on 
the legislative agenda setting and decision-making powers, the Swiss parliament enjoys many institutional 
advantages and thus is very strong indeed. However, focusing on the whole policy-making process, includ-
ing the pre- and post-parliamentary stage, the strong position of the parliament disappears and the govern-
ment turns out to be the most influential political actor due to its positional advantages” (Schwarz et  al. 
2011: 141). In short, the Swiss parliament is formally strong but informally weak.
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To do so, MPs have different instruments at their disposal.2 We focus on the two instru-
ments that oblige the government (i.e. in a binding way) to get active and implement the 
parliament’s requests. The so-called motions are the first such instrument. Through a 
motion, the parliament forces the government to submit a bill to the parliament and/or to 
take a certain action (Article 120(1) ParlA).3 Postulates are a second, weaker instrument at 
parliamentarians’ disposal. Postulates mandate the Federal Council to examine and report 
whether a bill and/or another measure should or should not be introduced.
Motions’ and postulates’ process requirements are generally the same, with some exceptions: 
Both types of parliamentary requests can be submitted by a parliamentarian committee, but they 
can also be presented by a single council member or a parliamentary group. While a motion is 
only issued and transferred to the Federal Council if approved by both chambers of the parlia-
ment, postulates only need to be approved by the parliament chamber in which they have been 
submitted. It should be noted that in many cases, parliamentary requests are tacitly approved—
the parliament does not explicitly vote on them. In fact, an explicit vote is only held if an item 
of business is opposed by at least one member of the National Council, i.e. the lower chamber, 
or by the government which, for its part, issues its acceptance or rejection in the run-up to the 
parliament’s decision. Additionally, a vote may be held if a proposal has been submitted by a 
parliamentary committee and a minority of this parliamentary committee opposes its approval.
Once the parliament approves the motion, the government implements it and, if it is 
fulfilled, requests its abandonment.4 The parliament then votes on the request. The aban-
donment of a postulate only requires the consent of one chamber—the chamber that has 
approved it—while motions need to be abandoned by both chambers (Article 124(5) 
ParlA). With motions, “[i]f a request for abandonment is rejected by both chambers, the 
government must fulfil the request contained in the motion within one year or within the 
period fixed by the two chambers on rejecting the request” (Article 122(5) ParlA).5
In light of our research question, it is important to note that this deadline only applies to 
motions for which the government has already issued an abandonment request. The Parlia-
ment Act does not, however, generally determine a formal time limit within which the gov-
ernment must implement a motion or a postulate after its approval. The only reference to 
a time limit in the Parliament Act indicates that the executive has to report on motions and 
postulates still pending two years after the parliament has approved them. In these reports, 
2 Parliamentary initiatives that enable individual MPs, a parliamentarian group, or a parliamentarian com-
mittee to propose a draft on a new enactment are another important instrument (Swiss Parliament, 2019). 
We do not include it because law making is the parliament’s responsibility, while the government is only 
involved at a late stage. Moreover, MPs can also make use of the instruments of interpellations and parlia-
mentary questions (Bailer, 2011).
3 Graf (2014: 829) mentions in that respect that the increasing number of motions in recent years has led 
to a situation in which the Federal Council is no longer able to really cope with these requests both in quan-
titative and qualitative terms. This had led to a devaluation of the motions, in practise, whereby they are 
often not treated as bindingly as required by law.
4 Abandonment may also be requested for unfulfilled requests which, according to the government, should 
not be carried out (Article 122(3) ParlA). However, these are rare cases that we do not specifically consider 
in this study. Indeed, based on a subsample of 600 requests, abandonment without fulfilment only occurred 
in 14 cases. Moreover, the Federal Council did initially support the majority of these cases and took some 
action towards their fulfilment. This implies that the decision to leave these items of business unfulfilled 
was not clear from the start.
5 If, however, the two chambers have adopted divergent decisions, a second rejection by either chamber is 
seen as final (Article 95 ParlA).
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the government has to explain what it has already done to fulfil the parliamentary request 
as well as any additional plans to further deal with its fulfilment.
Motions and postulates do not generally curtail the Federal Council’s potential influence 
on the legislative process. The parliamentarian political institutions committee has advanced 
an important critique: that the executive influences the law-making process through motions 
and postulates by delaying parliamentary requests. Such implementation delays, i.e. a long 
period between the parliament’s adoption of the request and the request’s abandonment, are 
possible due to the lack of formal time frames for the implementation of motions and postu-
lates. In the next section, we discuss potential theoretical grounds for this assumption.
Reasons for delaying parliamentary legislative requests: theoretical 
approach and hypotheses
As the introduction mentioned, the time variation in the implementation of parliamentary 
requests has hardly ever been empirically addressed. Accordingly, this topic also lacks theoretical 
foundations. However, this gap can be filled by combining the general findings of the studies on 
executive–legislative relations and on the institutional dimensions of the decision-making pro-
cess with findings from implementation research. The latter seems to be particularly appropriate 
for analysing governments’ executive function, which is inherently linked to bureaucratic politics.
We depart from theoretical approaches that conceptualize the dimensions and determi-
nants of (non-)compliance with legislative directives, which have been prominent in the field 
of multilevel implementation research (see, for example, Börzel, 2001; Chayes & Handler 
Chayes, 1993; Falkner et al., 2005; Simmons, 2002). More precisely and in accordance with 
Falkner et al. (2005), we understand non-implementation or delayed implementation as sub-
forms of non-compliance, which can emanate from an (unintentional) inability to implement 
parliamentary requests or intentional opposition to implementation. In the latter case, opposi-
tion to implementation can emerge from within the Federal Council itself, but also from other 
political actors which, in turn, might restrain the Federal Council’s options of accurately 
implementing requests. We argue that the non-implementation or the delayed implementation 
of parliamentary requests by the Federal Council can result from the facts that the Federal 
Council (a) cannot accurately implement requests (inability), (b) shall not accurately imple-
ment requests (opposition from outside the Federal Council), or (c) simply does not want to 
accurately implement requests (opposition from within the Federal Council). Similar mecha-
nisms—especially the distinction between capacity-related and political reasons for imple-
mentation delays—have been proposed by studies on bureaucratic rule-making in the USA 
(Bolton et al., 2016; Potter, 2017). We also rely on them to specify our theoretical expecta-
tions. In what follows, we will discuss some potential determinants of delayed implementa-
tion or non-implementation resulting from these three situations more closely.
Inability to implement
Implementing parliamentary requests can be both technically challenging and resource inten-
sive for the administrative offices in charge. The administration may sometimes just lack the 
capacity to implement (additional) parliamentary requests within a short time (Bolton et al., 
2016; Potter, 2017). Accordingly, implementation time is a measure of administrative per-
formance. If the administrative agencies are well equipped with personnel and resources, the 
implementation time should be shorter. Conversely, lengthy implementation times could be the 
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result of an administrative overload at the time when requests should be implemented and, thus, 
a sheer inability to work faster (Bolton et al., 2016; Falkner et al., 2005; Potter, 2017).
Usually, when motions and postulates are transferred to the Federal Council, they are 
assigned to one of the seven ministries, i.e. government departments, or more precisely to a 
specific Federal Office within a government department. These assignments are contingent 
on the item of business’s thematic focus and do not hinge on the actual workload caused by 
pending requests. As a result, different Federal Offices’ workloads related to the implemen-
tation of parliamentary instruments vary substantially. We expect that items of business 
that are the responsibility of a Federal Office with a lighter workload be implemented faster 
than items of business that fall under the responsibility of a Federal Office with a heavy 
workload. Hence, we assume that implementation time is closely related to the implemen-
tation workload of the responsible office:
Hypothesis 1 The higher the workload of the responsible administrative office, the 
longer the government needs to implement a parliamentary request.
The specific timing of request submission may also be important for other reasons. More 
precisely, we expect that personnel changes within the executive add to implementation delays 
(for a similar argument, i.e. the “Leadership Vacancy Hypothesis”, see Bolton et  al., 2016). 
In Switzerland, members of the government are elected by the parliament for a period of four 
years. Upon the conclusion of these four years, incumbent councillors are either confirmed in 
office or (voluntarily or involuntarily) replaced. Moreover, elections are also held to replace 
government members who step down during their term in office (Swiss Federal Chancellery, 
2019). In accordance with the executive’s organizational ordinance (Article 2), the Federal 
Council (re-)assigns responsibilities for the seven ministries after each election. In the course 
of this reshuffle, ministry responsibilities can change quite substantially, especially since taking 
over a new ministry is not unusual among re-elected incumbents. Given that such changes entail 
a period of vocational adjustment, they may also cause implementation delays.
Hypothesis 2 Changing the head of the responsible ministry delays the implementation 
of parliamentary requests.
The capacity mechanism may also be applicable to a more content-related argu-
ment. More specifically, different types of parliamentary requests may require varying 
degrees of effort. However, different argumentations are plausible. On the one hand, it 
can be assumed that implementing motions—requests that force the executive to draft 
a bill—requires more time than implementing postulates which, for their part, “only” 
require considering the need for legislative action(s). On the other hand, there also are 
reasons to believe that postulates require even more time to implement, particularly 
if the government has to commission external experts to conduct a study and write a 
report.6 Given these contrasting views, we test a non-directional hypothesis7:
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for directing us to this possibility.
7 There are several reasons to assume that the time variation in the implementation of parliamentary 
requests is not only related to the type of the request itself, but also to the specific type of action required. 
For example, motions that only require an ordinance may be less demanding and time-consuming than 
motions that force the Federal Council to introduce a new bill. Yet, as further analyses (not presented here) 
reveal, the implementation of motions and postulates typically calls for several distinct actions. Hence, there 
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Hypothesis 3 Motions and postulates have different implementation times.
Opposition within the parliament
The next two subsections focus on political motivations that may explain the observed vari-
ance in implementation speed. While political factors seem to be obvious in cases where 
we perceive the implementation of a parliamentary request as an element of the (politi-
cal) executive–legislative relationship, the relevance of political motivations has also been 
emphasized by scholars of bureaucratic policy making (Bolton et al., 2016; Potter, 2017).
In Switzerland, the use of parliamentary requests has significantly increased over the 
course of the last decades (Swiss Federal Chancellery, 2019; Vatter, 2020). However, not 
all submitted issues of business are remitted to the executive.8 Rather, as we described 
in  the “The Legislative Agenda-Setting Power of the Swiss Parliament: Instruments and 
Processes” section, to be issued and transferred to the executive, postulates need to be 
approved by the parliament chamber to which they were submitted. Motions even require 
approval by both chambers. Approval thereby suggests that the particular issue of busi-
ness is supported by a majority, which does not rule out that the issue has been subject to 
politically controversial discussion and even to considerable opposition by a parliamentary 
minority. This may be especially true for items related to topics addressing traditional party 
cleavages and/or emotional and disputed issues more generally (see Potter, 2017, for a sim-
ilar argument about a rule’s impact and complexity).
In turn, opposition from within the parliament makes it more demanding for the gov-
ernment to implement a given item of business within a short time as such a situation 
obliges the administration to seek a solution accommodating as many MPs as possible. 
The need to elaborate convincing solutions with majority appeal does not only arise from 
the parliament’s “blocking power” (Falkner et al., 2005).9 Comparing rule-making requests 
from different sources in the USA, West and Raso (2013) demonstrate that parliamentary 
requests take the administration longer to complete than requests initiated by other actors, 
not because they are assigned low priority but because they tend to involve more complex 
and contentious issues. On these grounds, we formulate the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4 The greater the opposition to an item of business within the parliament is, 
the longer it takes to implement the parliamentary request.
Hypothesis 5 Long implementation periods are typical for items of business addressing 
topics that are politically controversial.
8 According to Brüschweiler and Vatter’s (2018) data, less than 30% of all postulates and less than 20% of 
all motions submitted between 2004 and 2014 were actually approved and remitted to the government.
9 In Switzerland, the parliament can abandon any measure proposed by the executive in response to a par-
liamentary request. If this is the case, the government is obliged to resume the request and find a new solu-
tion with majority appeal.
Footnote 7 (continued)
are multiple possible combinations, which makes it very difficult to adequately assess the potential effects 
of the required types of action empirically.
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Opposition within the government
A main characteristic of the Swiss consensus democracy (Lijphart, 2012; Vatter et  al., 
2020) concerns the composition of the executive and its mode of operation (Klöti, 2007; 
Linder & Mueller, 2021). A distinct feature of the Swiss government is that the executive 
is based on a broad coalition of seven members who proportionally represent the four larg-
est parties.10 Consequently, the system enables different political forces to participate in 
government decisions and, thus, warrants shared political responsibility (Linder & Mueller, 
2021; Vatter, 2020). However, unlike conventional coalition governments, the four parties 
represented in the Swiss government “are not committed to a common political program” 
(Lüthi, 2007, 124). This implies the permanent negotiation and cooperative behaviour 
of the members of government (Klöti, 2007; Linder & Mueller, 2021). This is especially 
so since the “principle of collegiality” is one of the most important characteristics of the 
Swiss Government’s organizational structure. Said principle is not only contained in the 
provision of an equal vote for all Federal Council members, but also in Article 12 of the 
Government and Administration Organisation Act, which states that the Federal Council 
has to reach and represent its decisions as a collegial body.
The “need for partners with divergent preferences to make joint policy” (Martin & Van-
berg, 2005, 93) can be challenging. Martin and Vanberg (2005) assume that priority may 
therefore be given to issues that appeal to all partners in the coalition, while less appeal-
ing and more controversial issues may be more likely to be postponed. Moreover, priority 
for implementing a specific item of business might be rather low if the executive senses 
that the parliamentary request is primarily used for parliamentary oversight (Strøm et al., 
2010). We therefore suggest that the assumptions about the sources and effects of opposi-
tion within the parliament stated in hypotheses 4 and 5 also hold true as far as the govern-
ment is concerned. That is, requests may be given higher priority if the members of the 
government agree on the fact that legislative action is needed. This, in turn, implies that 
time variations in implementing parliamentary requests are related to the implementation 
preferences of the executive itself.11
Given the Federal Council’s obligation to speak with one voice, we formulate the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6 Items of business supported by the Federal Council itself are implemented 
faster than items of business that the Federal Council opposes.
Methodology
We test our hypotheses empirically based on the CUBE data set (Parliamentary Control of 
the Administration, 2018). This database was compiled by the Parliamentary Control of 
the Administration (PCA), the evaluation service of the Federal Assembly. The information 
10 The four parties are: Swiss People’s Party, FDP.The Liberals, Christian Democratic People’s Party, and 
Social Democratic Party.
11 This argument is in keeping with the idea that implementation delays could be a reflection of strategic 
calculations, a mechanism that has recently been shown to explain variation in the pace of US bureaucratic 
agencies’ rule-making (Potter, 2017). In this view, administrations can both “fast-track” and “slow-roll” 
rule-making and, therefore, influence the rule’s political success or failure according to their preferences.
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contained therein is mainly taken from the database of parliamentary proceedings, Curia 
Vista,12 and from the Federal Council’s yearly reports on motions and postulates.
The CUBE database represents a systematic collection of all motions and postulates that 
were approved between the parliament’s 2003 winter session and its 2018 spring session. 
As Table  1 shows, a total of 2233 items of business were approved during this period. 
About 70% of them were abandoned by the end of the 2018 spring session. The remaining 
parliamentary requests were still pending at that time.
Our main variable of interest (i.e. our main dependent variable) is the duration of these 
observations’ implementation calculated as the number of days between their approval 
and their abandonment. As we do not know the date of abandonment of requests that are 
still pending, our data are right censored. We use survival analysis in order to account for 
this data structure and still include these most recent cases (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 
1997, 2004; Golub, 2007). Hence, we model implementation duration as a parliamentary 
request’s “survival time”, i.e. until it is abandoned by the parliament. A dummy variable 
thereby measures whether a legislative request has actually been abandoned—whether the 
target event has happened—or not. In a first empirical step, we present nonparametric sur-
vival curves that plot bivariate patterns of the probability that an item of business has not 
been abandoned after a certain duration.13 We then proceed with estimating Cox propor-
tional hazards models that include our explanatory variables. In both empirical steps, we 
exclude motions and postulates (pending or abandoned) with extra-long implementation 
times (> 2200 days, N = 113). This decision obeys expert assessments that such overly long 
implementations are not only very rare, but should also be considered outliers that often 
hinge on other institutional factors and peculiarities not discussed here.
Following our hypotheses, we focus on six explanatory variables. First, to measure 
the motion- and postulate-related workload of the responsible Federal Office’s, we con-
structed a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the responsible Federal Office was 
in charge of at least 90 items of business during the investigated period, i.e. between the 
parliament’s 2003 winter session and its 2018 spring session. The limit of 90 items of busi-
ness is justified by empirical distribution criteria—the group of federal offices with 90 and 
more requests empirically stands out rather clearly from those with a (often much) smaller 
workload (see Fig. 5 in “Appendix”). Measuring the workload of a Federal Office is not 
self-evident. Yet, we argue that considering the distribution of parliamentary requests in 
the period under investigation and across the different Federal Offices is a simple but reli-
able approximation.14 There is no reason to believe that this general distribution should 
12 Curia Vista—Database of parliamentary proceedings, https:// www. parla- ment. ch/ en/ ratsb etrieb/ curia- 
vista.
13 We estimate survival curves with the Kaplan–Meier method using the survfit function in R.
14 We refrain from measuring workload on a yearly or legislature basis for several reasons. The most 
important one is that our dataset contains parliamentary requests adopted in a specific time frame and we 
only have this information to calculate the workload of a Federal Office. Hence, counting the number of 
requests per year would lead to a biased workload measure, particularly for the first years in our sample, 
since requests that have been adopted earlier and are still pending would be excluded, even though they 
actually make up a substantial part of the “workload” of an office at that time. Moreover, parliamentary 
requests are typically implemented over periods longer than one year (and, eventually, even over more than 
a single legislature). It is not evident which year is most relevant to a speedy or lengthy implementation and 
whether the same point in time would be relevant to all different items of business. Neither do we control 
for the size of the federal office. Whether an additional parliamentary request generates a resource problem 
can be rather independent from the size of the federal office but more strongly contingent on the availability 
of the right expertise and the right people. A specific item of business will be assigned to the team within 
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substantially vary over time. Moreover, we do not assume that the exact number of requests 
is related to the implementation time in a linear way but, rather, expect that there are gen-
eral differences between those with many items of business to handle and their less busy 
counterparts. Therefore, we use a dummy specification (see Fig. 8a in “Appendix” for an 
alternative metric specification leading to the same result). The second explanatory vari-
able is a dummy variable capturing whether the head of the responsible ministry changed 
during the implementation of the specific item of business.15 Third, in order to account for 
potential time variation related to the type of the parliamentary request, we use a dummy 
variable that differentiates between motions and postulates.
To capture opposition within the parliament, we first identified whether the parliament 
had voted on the approval of a specific item of business. If so, we calculated the ratio 
between the number of MP’s voting in favour and the number of MP’s voting against the 
item’s approval by calculating the difference between the “yes” and the “no” votes and 
dividing it by the total number of votes. Items of business that had been tacitly approved 
received a value of 1 (i.e. no opposition). Thus, our opposition indicator ranges between 0 
and 1, whereby lower numbers imply a smaller majority supporting the item. In contrast, 
high values indicate that a broad, multiparty coalition (more or less explicitly) supported 
the parliamentary request.
Moreover, we want to measure an item’s potential for causing political controversy, 
which, however, is not an easy task. Indeed, we are not able to assess the level of contro-
versy based on a parliamentary request’s content. Yet, in light of the recent political discus-
sion in Switzerland, arguably the most heated debates usually emerge around reforms deal-
ing with social policy provisions as well as migration-related policies. This is also reflected 
in the fact that those topics were most frequently subjects of optional referendums and ini-
tiatives. Given that the ministries in Switzerland are responsible for specific issue areas, 
we assume that ministries like the FDHA (Federal Department of Home Affairs), which is 
responsible for social security measures, among other things, or the FDJP (Federal Depart-
ment of Justice and Police), which is responsible for (im-)migration policies, have to deal 
with more contested and complex issues than other ministries.16 In contrast, we expect that 
items that fall under the FDFA’s (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs) responsibility 
are much less contested since the domain of foreign policies traditionally belongs to the 
government’s exclusive realm. Accordingly, foreign policy stands outside the usual party 
conflicts and other domestic disputes (Goetschel, 2014; Jaquet et al., 2019). Since diplo-
macy is responsible for foreign policy, the parliament is more reserved in this policy area 
than in domestic policy and the government can be expected to implement the compara-
tively few parliamentary requests more quickly. Based on these assumptions, we argue that 
16 An indicator of the validity of this assumption is the number of facultative referenda that fall within 
these ministries’ jurisdictions. Facultative referendums are launched when relevant social groups oppose 
a parliamentary decision. This is particularly likely if the proposal was already conflictual in parliament. 
Considering all facultative referenda over the last 20 years shows that 27 referenda concerned social issues 
and 16 proposals concerned the Federal Department of Justice and Police. Conversely, only 7 facultative 
referendums were held on foreign affairs and 9 on public finances (www. swiss votes. ch).
15 As the implementation of parliamentary requests takes some time, almost 30% of all items of business 
are affected by such reorganization, even though changes of department heads are generally rare (Linder 
and Mueller 2021; Vatter 2020).
the federal office with the greatest expertise, and the size of these teams is not necessarily larger in larger 
federal offices.
Footnote 14 (continued)
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ministry responsibility may constitute a crude proxy for thematic focus and, thus, for an 
item’s potential complexity and controversial nature. Accordingly, our analyses use dummy 
variables indicating the ministry that has been assigned responsibility for a particular item 
of business.17
Our last explanatory variable has to do with the opposition an item of business might 
meet with within the executive. We include a variable that measures whether the govern-
ment proposed the acceptance, the partial acceptance, or the rejection of a motion or a 
postulate in the run-up to its approval in parliament.
Besides our crucial explanatory variables, our regression analyses control for two addi-
tional factors that may influence implementation delays. First, in order to account for poten-
tial time effects, we integrate a variable that defines the legislative term. On the one hand, 
this allows us to control for systematic variation in implementation time over time, namely 
that items that have been submitted more recently have a systematically higher probabil-
ity of exhibiting short implementation times and/or not being abandoned yet. Moreover, 
this variable may also capture changes in the political context, namely differing political 
dynamics, e.g. due to varying composition of the parliament or varying degrees of polari-
zation. Furthermore, we account for the fact that some items of business cannot be con-
sidered independent from each other. In fact, it is not unusual for MP’s to join forces and 
individually submit a motion or a postulate with a similar or even identical content. This 
is done to put more emphasis on a specific topic. We control for this lack of independence 
by including a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is an item with a similar or 
identical content.18
Empirical results
Implementation time frames: survival curves
Initially, we find considerable variation in the time needed for parliamentary requests’ 
implementation. Indeed, while the government implements most parliamentary requests 
Table 1  Motions and Postulates 
contained in the CUBE database. 
Source: Prepared by the authors 
based on the CUBE database
Pending Abandoned Total
Motions 285 692 977
Postulates 384 872 1256
Total 669 1564 2233
17 As an alternative measure for issue complexity, we also considered a dummy identifying parliamentary 
requests that concern international agreements, where the multilevel nature of the decision can be seen as 
another source of complexity. However, this variable was not significant in the additional models presented 
in Fig. 8b in “Appendix” and it did not change our findings.
18 We also considered factors related to the dimension of party politics, e.g. who proposed the parliamen-
tary request (in particular, a multiparty committee or a party) and in which chamber of the parliament was 
a request initiated. Theoretically, however, we argue that these factors should influence the acceptance of 
legislative requests, rather than their implementation. Further analyses corroborated this expectation empir-
ically. None of these factors was significantly related to implementation times, nor did they affect the find-
ings presented in this study. These models can be found in Fig. 8b in “Appendix”.
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within 800 to 1500 days, i.e. more or less 2 to 3 years, the implementation time of distinct, 
already abandoned items of business ranges between 92 days and more than eleven years 
(see Table 2 in “Appendix”).
As shown in Fig.  1, and in contrast to our expectation (H3), this variation does not 
apparently hinge on the type of the parliamentary request. The figure plots the survival 
curves of both postulates and motions and shows that both types of parliamentary requests 
experience time variation in their implementation. The likelihood of being pending (which 
is the inverse of the probability that an item of business is abandoned) decreases as the 
implementation time increases. However, mean duration does not significantly vary across 
instruments (p value = 0.91).
Conversely, the upper left panel in Fig. 2 shows that highly busy federal offices are char-
acterized by significantly longer implementation times than those of their counterparts that 
deal with a lower number of parliamentary requests. This pattern is in accordance with 
our first hypothesis that implementation delays may occur due to overload. Moreover, the 
other plots depicted in Fig.  2 suggest that neither personnel changes, i.e. ministry reas-
signments within the government, nor potential opposition within either the parliament or 
the government significantly affect time variation in parliamentary requests’ implementa-
tion. However, a closer look at the descriptive statistics presented in Fig. 6 in “Appendix” 
also reveals that those results need to be handled with care. In fact, the figures plotting the 
position of the government and the parliament suggest that opposition to parliamentary 
requests is the exception rather than the rule and, thus, the number of cases in these respec-
tive categories is very low.19 As far as ministry reassignments within the government are 
concerned, the figure (bottom left) indicates that personnel changes may increase varia-
tion in implementation time frames. Until implementation time frames reach 1800 days, 
changes in a ministry’s leadership seem to be clearly associated with higher probabilities of 
non-abandonment. This pattern is reversed for very long implementation durations, which 
might explain the fact that the mean difference is not significant.
Lastly, Fig.  3 suggests that the responsible ministry is a relevant factor in explaining 
variation in parliamentary requests’ implementation. What is more, Fig. 3 seems to cor-
roborate our hypothesis that this variation is attributed to differences in the departments’ 
thematic focus. As expected, implementation time frames seem to be particularly long for 
items of business that fall under the responsibility of the Federal Departments of Home 
Affairs and Justice and Police. Conversely, the time frames of items that fall under the 
jurisdictions of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defense are par-
ticularly short.
19 As far as the upper-right-side panel of the figure which focuses on the vote in parliament is concerned, 
it should be recalled that the Swiss parliament has to vote on the approval of any item of business that has 
been opposed by the executive. Accordingly, in those cases there is no need for an MP who does not agree 
with an item to “additionally” oppose the motion or postulate. This, in turn, implies that we cannot deter-
mine whether items that have been opposed by the government would otherwise have been opposed by the 
parliament or not.
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Explaining time variation in implementing parliamentary requests
To more systematically test our hypotheses, we now turn to the results of a Cox propor-
tional hazards regression model.20 Figure 4 presents the hazard ratios (HR) based on this 
model and contingent on the different predictors, whereby a HR > 1 indicates an increased 
likelihood of abandonment (i.e. a shorter implementation time), while a value below 1 
stands for a decreased likelihood that a parliamentary request is abandoned (i.e. a longer 
implementation time).
The results corroborate the previous finding that implementation times do not differ 
between motions and postulates.21 This result probably mirrors repealing effects associated 
with the request’s type. That is, on the one hand and as hypothesis 3 proposes, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that implementing motions requires more time than implementing pos-
tulates, as motions force the Federal Council to fulfil the complex task of drafting a bill. On 
the other hand, requests are arguably ascribed greater importance than postulates which, in 
turn, may exert more pressure on the government to implement the request within a reason-
able time.
Furthermore, the model shows that opposition within the parliament is not significantly 
associated with longer implementation periods.
20 Further estimations using OLS regression models and focusing on abandoned legislative requests are 
presented in Fig. 7 in “Appendix”. They largely confirm the results presented in the following discussion.
21 In additional analyses not presented here, we further investigated whether we might observe motion- or 
postulate-specific features when including interactions between our motion variable and the other independ-
ent variables in our model. However, we did not find any significant and substantial effects.
Fig. 1  Implementation time frames contingent on the request type. Note: Prepared by the authors based on 
the CUBE database. N = 1902 (785 motions and 1117 postulates)
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22 The workload dummy denoting highly burdened Federal Offices and our ministry-based proxy for the 
complexity of issues are not strongly related. The highly burdened Federal Offices belong to five different 
ministries. This speaks for the fact that the two variables capture different resource-related aspects that may 
impede timely implementation.
Our hypotheses further suggested that items of business that are supported by the gov-
ernment are implemented faster than items of business that the executive opposes from 
the start. Yet, as our results show, there is no empirical support for this notion; rather, the 
opposite seems to be the case: Those parliamentary requests that are accepted by the gov-
ernment are characterized by a longer implementation time. However, the differences are 
not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the association suggests the interpretation that 
items supported by the government may be implemented with particular attention and care 
as the government agrees on the fact that there is a need for action. This strong engagement 
may require more time.
In contrast, the remaining variables reach statistical significance. First, the model sup-
ports our assumption that a high workload of the responsible Federal Offices is associated 
with implementation lags. While we are not able to empirically test the underlying causal 
mechanism, we interpret this lag as suggesting that highly busy Federal Offices have lim-
ited resources. For this reason, they lack the capacity to implement parliamentary requests 
within a short time.
Second, this may be related to the finding that implementation time frames vary across 
different ministries.22 Our model specified the Federal Department of the Environment, 
Fig. 2  Survival plots. Source: Prepared by the authors based on the CUBE database. N = 1902 (785 motions 
and 1117 postulates)
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Transport, Energy and Communication as the reference category. Given almost all other 
ministries’ positive hazard rates, the results indicate that the probability of implementa-
tion delays is highest for items of business that are implemented under the responsibil-
ity of the Federal Department of Home Affairs. However, while most differences do not 
reach statistical significance, both the Federal Office of Foreign affairs (as expected) and 
the Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research exhibit significantly shorter 
implementation times than the Environment, Energy and Communication ministry (the ref-
erence category). In this vein, the model is also (partly) in line with our hypothesis that the 
detected variation may be attributed to differences in the ministries’ thematic focus.
Third, the regression analysis confirms that changes in the responsible ministry’s head 
delay parliamentary requests’ implementation. In accordance with our hypothesis, this can 
be explained with the fact that such changes imply periods of vocational adjustment. More-
over, in the Swiss consensual multiparty government—and unlike the so-called midnight 
rule-making practice of outgoing presidents in the USA (O’Connell, 2008; Potter, 2017)—
it is assumed that members of government who plan to take on a new ministry or to step 
down in the foreseeable future do not tackle items of business that they cannot successfully 
conclude in their remaining time in office.
Lastly, regarding our control variables, whether or not another legislative request with a 
similar or identical context exists does not significantly affect implementation times. Fur-
thermore, the results show that parliamentary requests submitted in a more recent legis-
lative term have a significantly lower hazard rate, i.e. a higher probability of still being 
Fig. 3  Differences across departments. Note: Prepared by the authors based on the CUBE database. 
N = 1902 (FDFA (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs) = 99; FDHA (Federal Department of Home 
Affairs) = 402; FDF (Federal Department of Finance) = 285; FDJP (Federal Department of Justice and 
Police) = 297; DETEC (Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communica-
tions) = 409; DDPS (Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport) = 91; and EAER (Federal 
Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research) = 319)
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pending.23 This may be the result of the data’s specific time structure. Conversely, there is 
no indication that varying political dynamics during the different legislation terms affected 
the implementation time frame of legislative requests.
Conclusions
With this paper, we seek to contribute to the literature on parliaments’ legislative agenda-
setting power and the associated executive–legislative relations by investigating whether 
and how the government may influence parliamentary legislative agenda setting. More pre-
cisely, we focused on the Swiss case and asked how the time variation in the implementa-
tion of parliamentary requests can be explained. We relied on a novel database including 
a systematic collection of all motions and postulates that have been approved between the 
parliament’s 2003 winter session and its 2018 spring session. The most important findings 
can be summarized as follows.
First, the Swiss government implements most parliamentary requests within 800 and 
1500 days, i.e. within, approximately, two to four years. While there is no strict criterion 
determining whether this implementation time is appropriate or too long, the considerable 
Fig. 4  Survival model. Note: Hazard rates with 95%-confidence intervals. N = 1902 observations. Observa-
tions that fall within the responsibility of the Federal Chancellery and the parliament are excluded due to 
low number of cases. Outliers (i.e. items of business that were not implemented within 2200 days) were 
also excluded
23 As Fig.  8c in “Appendix” demonstrates, the use of a metric time variable instead of legislative terms 
leads to the same conclusion, while all other findings remain unchanged.
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time variation suggests that factors internal to the implementation process influence the 
time needed for implementing a parliamentary request.
Second, when investigating the latter, it is obvious that time variation in implement-
ing parliamentary requests is associated with a range of different factors. More precisely, 
the implementation of parliamentary requests takes significantly longer if the responsible 
Federal Office is burdened with many requests, if the request is likely to cover a complex 
or controversial issue, and if the head of the responsible ministry changes during the imple-
mentation process. Conversely, we did not find evidence for our assumption about the dif-
ferences across request types. Likewise, opposition from within the parliament does not 
seem to be associated with the length of an item’s implementation period, nor do we find 
a statistically consistent relationship between the government’s position on a legislative 
request and the latter’s implementation time.
In terms of policy implications, our results largely confirm the findings of existing 
implementation research—effective implementation is driven by resource-related and 
structural conditions. In accordance with prior research pointing to the importance of 
adequate administrative structures and sufficient management resources (Sager, 2007; 
Simmons, 2002), we conclude that a high workload may lead to delays in the process-
ing and implementation of parliamentary requests. Moreover, Sabatier and Mazmanian 
(1980) describe a high degree of stability in framework conditions as one of six prereq-
uisites for high implementation success. Our findings imply that changes of the head of a 
ministry (but also when parliamentary requests move from one ministry to another) disrupt 
this stability and complicate implementation, as they tie resources up and entail a loss of 
expertise. It needs to be mentioned that our findings stem from a highly stable political 
context. For example, there has not been a single change in the party–political composition 
of the Swiss collegial government between 1959 and 2003, and the same four parties that 
gained representation in 1960 were still represented in the executive in 2020. Accordingly, 
the combination of a broad-based multiparty government and strong direct democracy has 
resulted in the absence of a "classic" parliamentary opposition in Switzerland (Church & 
Vatter, 2009). If changes in government and administrative reorganization are important 
drivers of implementation delays in a context like Switzerland, it seems relevant to more 
specifically investigate these factors, especially in political systems characterized by lower 
levels of stability.
A second implication is that a lengthy implementation of parliamentary requests does 
not primarily result from hampered opportunities or the government’s lack of will to imple-
ment parliamentary demands. Put differently, there is no support for the idea that the gov-
ernment “shall not” or “does not want to” implement faster. Rather, long implementation 
periods are mostly related to the fact that the government “cannot” implement faster (the 
inability argument), i.e. to factors such as highly busy Federal Offices or complex and con-
troversial issues, while delays may be less significantly related to the government taking 
advantage of its role as a gate keeper.
681Policy Sciences (2021) 54:663–690 
1 3
Our study is certainly not without limitations. Most important, while we were able to 
make use of a novel data set, the available data mainly provide information about proce-
dural and structural factors, while almost no information about the specific content of a 
parliamentary request is available. This makes it impossible to delve deeper into the imple-
mentation’s quality. A path for future research could be to study the relationship between 
the time used for implementing parliamentary requests and the extent to which the parlia-
ment’s will is actually implemented. Moreover, the study focuses exclusively on Switzer-
land, which exhibits a particular formal setting in terms of the relationship between the 
executive and the legislative.
Nevertheless, besides the substantial implications discussed above, we argue that our 
study also provides important insights for policy analysis in general and into the role of 
governments in implementing legislative requests more specifically. Switzerland still 
allows us to investigate the case of an independent and active legislature in a non-parlia-
mentary but European multiparty system. Our study thereby contributes to the current 
"parliamentary decline thesis” in parliamentary systems of government (Kreppel, 2014) 
and offers a possible answer to the question of what could happen in these systems if the 
legislature and its members played a more powerful role in initiating legislation.
More conceptually, our analysis demonstrates that focusing on the procedural dimen-
sion can provide new empirical and theoretical insights into the executive–legislative rela-
tionship. Empirically, our study suggests that previous research may have overestimated 
the government’s agenda-setting power, mainly because structural and resource aspects 
limit governments’ control over the implementation of parliament’s requests. Theoretically, 
we are able to show that the combination of parliamentary research and implementation 
studies enables us to formulate different mechanisms that may affect the executive–legisla-
tive relationship in practice. Specifically, the comparison with bureaucratic rule-making in 
the USA (Bolton et al., 2016; Potter, 2017) or multilevel governance, e.g. in the European 
Union (Borghetto & Franchino, 2010; König & Luetgert, 2009), demonstrates that different 
elements of policy making in different political settings can be theoretically and conceptu-
ally analysed by relying on very similar mechanisms. Making use of these similarities may 
be a fruitful path for further research; for example, in efforts to generate more generalized 
knowledge about the conditions under which “sincere” or “strategic delay” are likely to 
occur, namely, whether any systematic patterns contingent on the political system or the 
specific stage of rule-making can be identified.
Appendix
See Figs. 5, 6, 7 and Table 2.
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Fig. 5  Number of legislative requests per Federal Office. Note: Prepared by the authors based on the CUBE 
database. N = 2147 (922 motions and 1225 postulates)
683Policy Sciences (2021) 54:663–690 
1 3
Fig. 6  Descriptive figures. Note: Box plots, based on abandoned parliamentary requests only. Left graph: 
N = 1564 (No vote = 1205, Yes = 359); right graph: N = 1562 (Acceptance = 1194; Partial acceptance = 38; 
Refusal = 330). Source: Prepared by the authors based on the CUBE database
Fig. 7  OLS regression results focusing on abandoned parliamentary requests. Note: Regression estimates 
with 95% confidence intervals. N = 1392 observations. Observations that fall within the responsibility of 
the Federal Chancellery and the parliament are excluded due to low number of cases. Outliers (i.e. items of 
business that were not implemented within 2200 days) were also excluded. For illustrative purposes, posi-
tive coefficients are in orange and the year of adoption has been divided by 5
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Table 2  Descriptive statistics
Implementation time: all requests
 Mean (SD) 1187.4 (742.5)
 Median (Q1, Q3) 1082 (720, 1456)
 Min–Max 0–5121
 Missing 0
Implementation time: abandoned requests 
only
 Mean (SD) 1218.0 (639.8)
 Median (Q1, Q3) 1091.5 (814, 1456)
 Min–Max 92–4015
 Missing (i.e. pending) 669
Type of parliamentary request
 Motion 977 (43.8%)
 Postulate 1256 (56.2%)
 Missing 0
Charged federal office
 NO 1032 (48.1%)
 YES 1115 (51.9%)
 Missing 86
Personnel changes FC
 NO 1582 (70.8%)
 YES 651 (29.2%)
 Missing 0
Opposition in federal assembly
 Mean (SD) 0.754 (0.353)
 Median (Q1, Q3) 1.000 (0.403 1.000)
 Min - Max 0.005–1.000
 Missing 0
Opposition  federal council
 Refusal 537 (24.1%)
 Partial acceptance 58 (2.6%)
 Acceptance 1636 (73.3%)
 Missing 2
Responsible ministry
 BK 40 (1.8%)
 FDFA 108 (4.8%)
 FDHA 477 (21.4%)
 FDF 340 (15.2%)
 FDJP 345 (15.5%)
 Parliament 11 (0.5%)
 DETEC 470 (21.0%)
 DDPS 98 (4.4%)
 EAER 344 (15.4%)
 Missing 0
Adoption year
  Mean (SD) 2011.2 (3.7)
 Median (Q1, Q3) 2011 (2008, 2014)
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Robustness analyses: additional models
See Fig. 8.




 None 2055 (92.0%)
 Same Item 178 (8.0%)
 Missing 0
Legislative term
 47 425 (19.1%)
 48 691 (30.9%)
 49 782 (35.0%)
 50 334 (15.0 %)
 Missing
Overall (N = 2233)
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Fig. 8  a Workload as a metric variable. Note: Basic model as presented in Fig. 4 but using a metric speci-
fication of a Federal Office’s workload instead of a dummy. The workload variable has been divided per 
100 (i.e. number of requests/100) to make the coefficient and the interval visible. b Additional covariates. 
Note: Basic model as presented in Fig. 4 but with additional control variables. First Council: The chamber 
of parliament that initiated the legislative request. Proposed By: The initiator of a request, namely whether 
it was proposed by a (multiparty) committee or by a specific party. International: Whether (1) or not (0) a 
parliamentary request contains a supranational aspect, potentially involving more complexity due to multi-
level governance. c Time as a metric variable. Note: Basic model as presented in Fig. 4 but using a metric 
specification of time instead of the legislative term
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